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Abstract
Quasi-set theory Q allows us to cope with certain collections of objects
where the usual notion of identity is not applicable, in the sense that x = x
is not a formula, if x is an arbitrary term. Q was partially motivated by
the problem of non-individuality in quantum mechanics. In this paper
I discuss the range of explanatory power of Q for quantum phenomena
which demand some notion of indistinguishability among quantum ob-
jects. My main focus is on the double-slit experiment, a major physical
phenomenon which was never modeled from a quasi-set-theoretic point
of view. The double-slit experiment strongly motivates the concept of
degrees of indistinguishability within a field-theoretic approach, and that
notion is simply missing in Q. Nevertheless, other physical situations may
eventually demand a revision on quasi-set theory axioms, if someone in-
tends to use it in the quantum realm for the purpose of a clear discussion
about non-individuality. I use this opportunity to suggest another way to
cope with identity in quantum theories.
Keywords: indistinguishability double-slit experiment quasi-sets identity quan-
tum field theory
1 Introduction
Since its early days, quantum mechanics has motivated a vast amount of unex-
pected explanations for extraordinary phenomena [13], multiple interpretations
of mathematical models and physical phenomena [15] [5] [2] (among many oth-
ers), several Gedanken experiments [38], and many philosophical debates as well
[17]. Eventually some philosophical perspectives seem to be strong enough to
motivate new mathematical approaches. That was what happened with Heinz
Post’s views concerning (non)individuality in quantum physics [30]. Such a
philosophical paper by Post provided a strong case for De´cio Krause’s Quasi-Set
Theory [19] [10]. According to Post, the non-individuality of quantum particles
should be ascribed right at the start , as we further discuss in the next sections.
And that was what Krause and collaborators did: a mathematical framework
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inspired on Post’s ideas. Nevertheless, Post’s ideas concerning the problem of
identity in quantum theories were published five decades ago. And a lot has
happened in the study of quantum phenomena since then. One of the novelties
regards possible violations of the Symmetrization Postulate [1] [28]. And since
the Symmetrization Postulate plays a major role for justifying the use of quasi-
set theory in quantum physics [8] [9] [10], maybe it is time to think again about
the relationships between the usual notions of indistinguishability in quantum
theories and the quasi-set-theoretic approach for those theories. After all, quasi-
set theory is grounded on the belief that quantum indistinguishability entails
some sort of non-individuality among quantum objects. And that is a conclusion
that may be precipitated.
In order to avoid possible misunderstandings about the contents of this
paper, here follows a brief warning. One thing is a mathematical framework
used for understanding and modeling physical phenomena. Another situation
is the philosophical discussions concerning possible interpretations of formal
frameworks. Since my goal here is closely connected to the problem of non-
individuality in quantum theories, a few words must be said about terms like
“individuality”, “non-individuality”, “identity”, and alike. Many philosophical
discussions about individuality (and eventually non-individuality) were moti-
vated by mathematical descriptions and even physical phenomena concerning
the quantum realm. And I believe it is safe to say that those discussions were
strongly motivated by some notion of indistinguishability commonly used in the-
oretical physics. For details see [10]. Well, if that is true, we need to identify
those situations where any notion of indistinguishability plays any important
role in physics. Quantum mechanics and non-relativistic quantum field theories
are well known examples of physical theories where that happens.
Quantum statistics, for example, demand some radical notion of indistin-
guishability among particles. That happens because permutations of quantum
particles among quantum states are deemed as not observable (even in princi-
ple). That corresponds to the Symmetrization Postulate (SP), which is stated
here in an intuitive way (as it usually happens in specialized literature about
physics). And such an intuitive statement for the SP is, by itself, quite con-
fusing. After all, if permutations are not observable, how can we even know
there was any permutation at all? Although unicorns are not observable, that
fact does not legitimate any serious study about a legendary horse with a single
straight horn projecting from its forehead. If permutations are not observable,
does that mean permutations are not possible? What is the difference between
one statement (non observability) and the other (impossibility)? One could ar-
gue that SP is an invariance principle from physics. But invariance principles
are usually stated as valid for certain physical systems S in order to study those
properties which are not invariant within subsystems of S. And that is not the
case of SP. Quasi-set theory, on the other hand, allows us to rewrite SP within a
specific and clear formal language. But even in that case, we can see something
rather important is still missing. We go back to that point in Section 3.
Another example is the spectral lines of elements. In order to accommodate
the observed spectral lines of the Helium atom, for example, we need to take into
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account some sort of radical indiscernibility between its protons. Both situations
(quantum statistics and the Helium atom) are examined in [21], where quasi-set
theory is successfully employed from a logical point of view.
Nevertheless, there are other situations where indistinguishability plays a
fundamental role. One of them is the double-slit experiment (Young interfer-
ometer), discussed in the next Section. Since there is no gas of trajectories and
since trajectories are no physical components of atoms, that situation deserves
a rather special attention. The double-slit experiment strongly suggests a close
relationship between indistinguishability of photon trajectories (which is equiv-
alent to indistinguishability between photon sources) and coherence (between
fields). That was precisely demonstrated by Mandel [23], in a paper which in-
troduces the quantitative concept of degrees of indistinguishability. More than
that, Mandel’s degrees of indistinguishability are identical to degrees of coher-
ence in a precise framework. That means a comprehensive understanding of the
double-slit experiment can bring us some light about the wave/particle duality
of photons in a way which allows us to equal degrees of coherence to degrees
of path indistinguishability. So, my first concern here refers to those situations
where indistinguishability plays an important role in quantum theories. Next I
analyze those situations from a quasi-set-theoretic point of view. Why is that?
Because quasi-set theory was conceived from a philosophical perspective which
was committed to Heinz Post’s ideas. And Post’s ideas were strongly motivated
by those problems regarding indistinguishability in quantum mechanics.
In quasi-set theory Q there is a primitive binary relationship ≡ called indis-
tinguishability and a defined binary relationship =E called extensional identity.
Besides, terms in Q are either collections or atoms. Atoms are empty terms
which are not collections. So, the philosophical content here is as follows. If
x ≡ y we say there is no way to distinguish x and y. If x and y are atoms such
that x ≡ y entails x =E y, we say both x and y are the very same individual.
And such individuality is provided by extensional identity (as it happens in
ZFU, where individuality is granted through identity). If x ≡ y does not entail
x =E y, we say that although x is indistinguishable of y, that fact does not
allow us to say that either x or y is an individual. In that case we are talking
about non-individuals, in a very precise way provided by the axioms of Q. In [4]
and [35] there are some philosophical discussions about the explanatory power
of quasi-sets. Nevertheless, in this paper I am focused on the relations between
quasi-sets and quantum physics. Some authors [27] advocate that non-standard
approaches for dealing with the problem of (non)individuality (like quasi-set
theory and alike) are unnecessary. But necessary or not, the fact is that there
is a literature about this subject, which cannot be ignored. And in this paper I
follow a different approach for discussing Krause’s proposal. Even if we assume
a quasi-set-theoretic approach for dealing with identity issues, such a formal
framework is limited to very specific cases of quantum phenomena. In the next
sections I discuss such a limitation.
In other words, in this paper I am raising the following question: Does quasi-
set theory provide a comprehensive description into how indistinguishability is
related to identity within non-relativistic quantum physics?
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Since the early days of quantum studies it is well known that coherence, in
interference experiments, is somehow related to the indistinguishability of par-
ticle trajectories. If a photon is detected by a photodetector, such a particle can
come from either one of the two secondary sources in a double-slit experiment.
And if those two possible paths are indistinguishable, then the probability am-
plitude for the photon to be detected is the sum of the probability amplitudes
associated with the two possible paths. The detection probability, which is
the square modulus of the probability amplitude, then exhibits interference -
a well known phenomenon. Since there may be a precise definition for degrees
of coherence, why can’t we think about degrees of indistinguishability? And if
that is the case, how can quasi-set theory help us to cope with such degrees of
indistinguishability?
The quasi-set theoretic formalism for Fock Spaces [8] [9] is relevant in our
discussion in the next sections. After all, within Fock Spaces it is possible
to define creation and annihilation operators. And I show in this paper that
it is exactly within this field-theoretic framework (Fock Spaces) that quasi-set
theory fails to relate indistinguishability (between certain quantum objects) with
identity (of quantum objects).
From a sociological point of view, there are at least two possible method-
ologies for formally dealing with the relationships between indistinguishability
among quantum objects and their individuality. The first approach starts with
a metaphysical assumption which grounds all the necessary intuitions for the
development of at least one formal system. And that formal system is somehow
expected to provide a mapping between theoretical concepts and experiments.
The second approach starts with a catalogue of all available and relevant ex-
perimental results. Those experimental data provide all necessary intuitions for
the development of at least one formal system which, again, is supposed to pro-
vide a mapping between theoretical concepts and experiments. Once the theory
is developed, a metaphysical interpretation is almost unavoidable. I recognize
there is a vague distinction here concerning those methodologies. After all, any
metaphysical assumption for a physical theory is supposed to be based on exper-
imental data. But clearly quasi-set theory was developed according to the first
one, in the sense that some remarkable experimental data are simply ignored, for
example, in [10]. Some of those data refer to Mandel’s degrees of indistinguisha-
bility [23] in quantum optics and violations of the Symmetrization Postulate [1]
[28]. That is why the quasi-set-theoretic formalism for Fock spaces is relevant in
our discussion. Papers like [8] and [9] may suggest to their readers that quasi-set
theory is consistent with modern views regarding quantum theories. So, while
authors like Muller and Saunders [27] consider non-standard formal systems for
indistinguishability in quantum mechanics are unnecessary, in this paper I sim-
ply show that at least one of those non-standard formal systems (namely, Q)
does not provide a comprehensive picture for quantum mechanics. That means
this is a paper on the epistemological character of quasi-sets.
At the end of the paper I briefly discuss a possible way to cope with indis-
tinguishability issues without abandoning identity (in a sense). And the idea
suggested here is quite different from the one proposed by Muller and Saunders
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[27]. In [27] the authors are concerned with Leibnizs Principle of the Identity of
Indiscernibles. They discern fermions by means of relations which are indepen-
dent of quantum-mechanical probabilities. Nevertheless, in principle, there is at
least one way to formally describe indistinguishability among quantum objects
without any explicit reference to properties of those objects (whether relational
or not). And that can be achieved by focusing on the underlying logic of the
theory which is supposed to bring some light about indistinguishability.
So, my goal here can be briefly presented as it follows. The double-slit
experiment shows quasi-set theory does not provide a comprehensive picture for
the relationship between indistinguishability and identity in the quantum realm.
That happens because the double-slit experiment reveals a close relationship
between indistinguishability of photon paths and coherence of fields. And quasi-
set theory does not allow us to take into account the wave/particle duality and
its role on the understanding of indistinguishability, particularly if we intend to
address the concepts of individuality versus non-individuality. Quasi-set theory
is somehow focused on a limited view regarding quantum objects. That happens
due to a strong philosophical commitment concerning the concept of identity.
But it is possible that our attention should be addressed to other logical issues
rather than identity, as I finally discuss at the end of the paper.
2 Wave/Particle Duality
French and Krause claim that “standard set theories do not provide adequate
mathematical tools for dealing with collections of ‘legitimate’ indistinguishable
entities” [10]. In order to support their claim they appeal to some sort of
comparison between Schro¨dinger’s ideas (concerning the quanta) and the usual
ways identity is formalized in standard mathematics. According to Schro¨dinger,
“It is not at all easy to realize this lack of individuality and to find words for it”.
And standard set theories, on the other hand, are strongly grounded on a rigid
notion of identity. So, another kind of logical apparatus is provided through
quasi-set theory.
However, in 1991 - many years after Heinz Post published his famous paper
on (non)individuality [30] - Leonard Mandel published an intriguing and insight-
ful theoretical approach regarding the relationship between indistinguishability
(of secondary sources in the double-slit experiment) and coherence [23]. He
proved there may be a mathematical identity between indistinguishability and
coherence (which was inspired on experimental results [40]). And since coher-
ence admits degrees in a very precise sense, the same takes place with indistin-
guishability. That result suggests the problem of non individuality (in the sense
that individuality is related to indistinguishability) is a little more sophisticated
than just considering collections of indiscernible objects (as Krause and French
discuss in their book). The concept of indistinguishability (which seems to be
relevant for quantum trajectories, besides particles) seems to be directly related
to the particle/wave duality in quantum phenomena. And if that is true, quasi-
set theory does not provide a complete explanatory picture for the problem of
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non-individuality in quantum physics.
The reader could consider that my concern (stated in the previous para-
graph) is not legitimate due to the fact that quantum trajectories cannot be
considered quantum objects (in some way). Nevertheless, quantum trajectories
in the double slit experiment refer to field sources, whether they are secondary
or not. So, it makes sense to assume those trajectories are somehow related to
objects, namely, field sources.
Before introducing Mandel’s theoretical proposal, let me present his moti-
vations, which were based on a rather peculiar experiment [40]. Interference
experiments with single photons are commonly performed by means of a tech-
nique called parametric down-conversion. The general idea is something like
this. Nonlinear crystals (the parametric down-converters) are pumped by a high
energy photon which is converted into a pair of lower energy photons, namely,
the signal photon and the idler photon (principles of energy conservation and
momentum conservation are taken into consideration here). That is a standard
procedure for detection of second order interference (i.e., to study correlations
between field intensities between two points) of signal photons. And such a
technique is largely used for the generation of entangled photon pairs. And
Mandel’s mathematical results in [23] were strongly motivated by experimen-
tal results achieved with a specific experimental setup involving two coherently
parametric down-converters which were pumped by a single photon. For details
see [40]. So, here follows a brief description of the experiment.
In [40], the authors work with two similar nonlinear crystals in a Mach-
Zehnder-style interferometer. A single photon from an Argon laser is sent to a
beam splitter, which allows two possible paths. One path goes to one nonlinear
crystal and the other one goes to the other crystal. Those crystals (1 and 2)
decompose the incident photon into a pair of a signal photon and an idler photon
(for each crystal). Therefore, we have two possible signal photon paths and two
possible idler photon paths. The main goal of the experiment was to analyse
interference associated to the detected signal photons (whose trajectories come
together at a second beam splitter), as long the trajectories of the idler photons
are aligned. And Mandel and collaborators found the following results: (i) The
signal photons are coherent (interfere) even if there is no induced emission from
the second crystal (remember signal photons and idler photons are supposed to
be in an entangled state); and (ii) if the connection between the idler photons
is broken (by either misalignment or an opaque obstacle between the crystals),
then we have a correlation between signal photon paths and coherence of signal
photons. That correlation is as follows. When the connection between idler
photons is broken, it is possible to determine if the detected signal photon came
from crystal 1 or crystal 2, by counting coincidences of detection between the
signal detector and the idler detector. If both detectors register photons, then
we know the signal photon came from crystal 2. If the signal detector registers
a photon but the idler detector does not, then we know the signal photon came
from crystal 1. For details, as already said, see [40]. And this possibility of
distinguishing paths wipes out interference in the signal detector.
Mandel and collaborators interpreted their results as a consequence of the
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relationship between indistinguishability of the signal photon paths and coher-
ence. So, what is Mandel’s theoretical proposal?
By considering the simplest case of interference of two single-mode fields
from two secondary sources, and the detection of a single photon, Mandel starts
with the quantum state of a light beam given by
|ψ〉 = α|1〉1|0〉2 + β|0〉1|1〉2,
where |n〉i stands for the quantum state in which n photons originate from
secondary source si, and, of course,
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
In that case we have an entangled quantum state in which the photon can
originate either in source s1 with probability |α|2 or in source s2 with probability
|β|2. Nevertheless, those two possibilities may be simply indistinguishable, if
we are talking about a coherent mixture of states. What do we mean by that?
From an intuitive point of view, it means the detection of a single photon in
the photodetector does not provide enough information regarding that photon’s
path through the double-slit. From a deeper point of view, those possibilities are
strongly related to the coherence between both secondary sources, as I discuss
below.
Since density matrices are remarkably helpful for describing both pure and
mixed states, Mandel makes use of the density operator for the double-slit ex-
periment. In the case of an incoherent mixture we have a simple diagonal
operator
ρˆD = |α|2|1〉1|0〉2 2〈0|1〈1|+ |β|2|0〉1|1〉2 2〈1|1〈0|,
where D stands for distinguishability. Coefficients |α|2 and |β|2 are still prob-
abilities that the photon comes from secondary source s1 or secondary source
s2, respectively. But since we are talking about an incoherent mixture, such
probabilities may be (in principle) distinguished. As remarked by Mandel, “in
principle, there exists some experimental scheme that allows the source of a
detected photon to be identified.” Therefore, the problem of distinguishing tra-
jectories is now just an experimental challenge (like that one analysed in [40]).
In the case of a coherent mixture, we have another density operator, this
time non-diagonal. Its Fock expansion is given by:
ρˆID = |α|2|1〉1|0〉2 2〈0|1〈1|+ |β|2|0〉1|1〉2 2〈1|1〈0|+
αβ∗|1〉1|0〉2 2〈1|1〈0|+ h.c.,
where h.c. stands for the Hermitean conjugate of the previous term and ID is
an abbreviation for indistinguishability.
So, a quantum system prepared in ρˆID (photon paths are indistinguishable)
is capable of showing interference, while a system prepared in ρˆD (photon paths
are distinguishable) is not.
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Next Mandel considers an arbitrary one-photon state with density operator
ρˆ = ρ11|1〉1|0〉2 2〈0|1〈1|+ ρ22|0〉1|1〉2 2〈1|1〈0|+
ρ12|1〉1|0〉2 2〈1|1〈0|+ h.c. (1)
This last operator ρˆ can be decomposed in a unique form as it follows:
ρˆ = PIDρˆID + PDρˆD, (2)
where
PID + PD = 1. (3)
PID and PD stand, respectively, for the probabilities for the sources to be
intrinsically indistinguishable and distinguishable. Mandel presents a geomet-
rical interpretation for such a result in terms of Bloch vectors. For details, see
his paper.
Equation 2 is an identity between matrices. So,
ρ11 = |α|2,
ρ22 = |β|2,
ρ12 = PIDαβ
∗.
That means we can rewrite both PID and αβ
∗ solely in terms of matrix
elements as it follows:
αβ∗ =
√
ρ11ρ22 exp(i argρ12),
PID =
ρ12√
ρ11ρ22
exp(−i argρ12) = |ρ12|√
ρ11ρ22
.
PID is the degree to which the two sources are intrinsically indistinguishable
in the general quantum state ρˆ given by Equation 1. Thus, PID ∈ [0, 1].
An alternative theoretical solution for the problem of the physical interpre-
tation of PID may be found, e.g., in an independent work by Rabinowitz in [31].
This author takes into account the particle’s momentum components in order
to allow identification of the secondary source. From an experimental point of
view, this idea is somehow a good one. In [18], for example, the authors sent
single photons emitted by a quantum dot through a double-slit interferometer
and reconstructed these trajectories by performing a weak measurement of the
photon momentum. But in the case of Mandel’s proposal there is no need to
consider momentum [40].
In order to relate PID to the coherence properties of the source field, Mandel
uses a Fourier decomposition of the total field operator Eˆ(rj) – where j = 1, 2
– into its positive- and negative-parts Eˆ(+)(rj) and Eˆ
(−)(rj), respectively. By
assuming that
8
Eˆ(+)(rj) = Kaˆ,
where K is a complex constant and aˆ is a photon annihilation operator, now it
is possible to use Equation 1 in order to get the (second order) mutual coherence
function Γ
(1,1)
12 for the secondary sources:
Γ
(1,1)
12 = 〈Eˆ(−)(r1)Eˆ(+)(r2)〉 = |K|2Tr(aˆ†1aˆ2ρˆ) = |K|2ρ21,
where 〈· · ·〉 stands for statistical average and † denotes Hermitean conjugate.
Besides,
Γ
(1,1)
11 = |K|2ρ11 = |K|2|α|2
and
Γ
(1,1)
22 = |K|2ρ22 = |K|2|β|2
Finally, the normalized mutual coherence function is given by
γ
(1,1)
12 =
Γ
(1,1)
12
Γ
(1,1)
11 Γ
(1,1)
22
=
ρ21√
ρ11ρ22
.
In other words,
|γ(1,1)12 | = PID. (4)
This last equation is a major result obtained by Mandel, since it quantifies
(for the first time) a very old belief among physicists. It says the degree of
coherence is also the degree of intrinsic indistinguishability of the two secondary
sources.
Actually, in his paper Mandel goes further. He shows the degree of intrinsic
indistinguishability PID is also related to the fringe visibility V in an interference
experiment (PID ≤ V). For details see [23] and [39].
In [24] Mandel improved his results by considering a two-photon interference.
And once again it was confirmed an equality between a degree of coherence and a
degree of indistinguishability. So, in principle, Mandel’s results can be extended
to an arbitrary number of photons, despite the fact that any mathematical mod-
elling of such a many-particle-system is in no way an easy task to be performed.
An intriguing consequence from Mandel’s mathematical account is the fact
that it suggests something which may be going beyond experimental results.
The experimental setup in [40] works almost like an on/off switch, in the sense
of a broken/not-broken connection between idler photons’ paths. Nevertheless,
we cannot forget we can manage to deal with slight misalignments between idler
photons’ paths. Besides, it makes perfect sense talking about degrees of fringes
visibility in the double-slit experiment. And in the sense given above, a notion
of degrees of indistinguishability (equal to a degree of coherence) is consistent
with usual formalisms for non-relativistic quantum field theory. More recently
9
Coles and collaborators [6] demonstrated that wave-particle duality principles
precisely correspond to a modern formulation of the Uncertainty Principle. That
means the notion of partial indistinguishability between photon paths (in inter-
ferometers) is a quite common interpretation nowadays. For details, see [6] and
its references.
3 Quasi-Sets
In this Section I briefly discuss the Symmetrization Postulate within Quasi-Set
Theory Q. Besides, this brief review on Q is necessary for the discussion about
Mandel’s degrees of indistinguishability in the next Section.
Quasi-set theory Q [22] is a first order theory without identity [26], strongly
committed to ZFU (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Urelemente) like axioms.
Its primitive concepts are three unary predicate lettersm,M , and Z, two binary
predicate letters ∈ and ≡, and one unary function letter qc. Intuitively speaking,
all terms of Q are either collections (qsets) or atoms (Urelemente). If x is an
atom, then x is called either a micro-atom (m(x)) or a macro-atom (M(x)).
And the axioms of Q forbid the existence of any term which is a micro-atom
and a macro-atom. If Z(x), then x is a specific quasi-set which corresponds to
a standard set of ZFU, in a very precise sense. If x ∈ y, we say x belongs to
y. We can say that x is an element of y as well. If x ≡ y, we say x and y are
indistinguishable terms, or simply indistinguishable. Finally, qc(x) is referred to
as the quasi-cardinality of x. The intuitive idea concerning qc is that of “number
of elements of x” (whether it is finite or transfinite). In other words, even in a
formal theory without identity it is still possible to give a precise sense about
quantities.
The next definitions in Q give us a first formal glimpse about quasi-sets. The
symbol
... stands for a metalinguistic symbol used here to separate the definien-
dum and the definiens in each definition.
Definition 1 Q(x)
... ¬(m(x) ∨M(x))
We read Q(x) as “x is a quasi set”. In other words, no quasi-set is an atom.
Definition 2 x =E y
... (Q(x) ∧ Q(y) ∧ ∀z(z ∈ x ⇔ z ∈ y)) ∨ (M(x) ∧M(y) ∧
∀Qz(x ∈ z ⇔ y ∈ z)
∀Qz is the universal quantifier bounded to the predicate letter Q. This last
definition refers to extensional identity =E . The intuitive idea concerning the
formula x =E y is as it follows. Term occurrences x and y are extensionally
identical iff they are either (i) collections sharing the same elements or (ii)
macro-atoms belonging to the same collection.
The first axioms of Q are the following:
Q1 ∀x(x ≡ x)
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Q2 ∀x∀y(x ≡ y ⇒ y ≡ x)
Q3 ∀x∀y∀z((x ≡ y ∧ y ≡ z)⇒ x ≡ z)
Q4 ∀x∀y(x =E y ⇒ (A(x, x) ⇒ A(x, y))), where A(x, x) is a formula in Q
and A(x, y) is obtained from A(x, x) by replacing at least one of the free
occurrences of x by y, if y is free for x in A(x, x).
The first three axioms state indistinguishability is an equivalence relation.
Q4, on the other hand, is an axiom schema (for each formula A, as long as it
satisfies the conditions given above, there is a corresponding axiom following
Q4) which may be considered as the heart and soul of quasi-set theory.
In ZFU we have very similar axioms. Identity =, in that theory, is an
equivalence relation as well. But there is an axiom schema in ZFU which states
the following:
∀x∀y(x = y ⇒ (A(x, x)⇒ A(x, y))), (5)
where A(x, x) is a formula in ZFU and A(x, y) is obtained from A(x, x) by
replacing at least one of the free occurrences of x by y, if y is free for x in
A(x, x).
Such a scheme is known as the substitutivity axiom. Notwithstanding, Q4
is some sort of restriction on the use of ≡. Substitutivity (A(x, x) ⇒ A(x, y)),
in Q, can take place only among those very specific cases where x ≡ y entails
x =E y. Within quasi-set theory x =E y necessarily entails x ≡ y. But the
converse is not always valid since, according to definition 2, x =E y demands
very specific conditions for x and y. In other words, by comparing Q4 with
equation 5, it is clear that extensional identity =E in Q has all the features
of standard identity = in ZFU. And that is a key point. Quasi-set theory was
philosophically inspired on Post’s ideas. Thus, extensional identity is not a limit
case of indistinguishability. What does that mean? It means the universe of
discourse in Q clearly separates terms into two disjoint classes (I am using the
term “class” in an intuitive sense), namely, those terms who behave like terms
in ZFU (terms x such that either M(x) or Z(x)) and those who do not copy
ZFU. This last class corresponds to the non-standard counterpart of Q. In other
words, there is no continuum transition from indistinguishability to extensional
identity. There is no continuum transition from the non-standard counterpart
of Q to its classical counterpart.
In [22], e.g., the authors prove the following result: if axiom scheme Q4 is
replaced by a weaker statement which asserts that substitutivity (A(x, x) ⇒
A(x, y)) can take place only when x ≡ y and neither x nor y is a micro-atom,
then this new version of quasi-set theory is equivalent to ZFU. That means
indistinguishability is simply reduced to standard identity if we promote such
a modification on Q4. In other words, substitutivity (A(x, x) ⇒ A(x, y)) is a
very sensitive issue in the quasi-set-theoretic framework, when x ≡ y, in the
sense there is no continuum transition from indistinguishability to extensional
identity. Depending on the way we state axiom Q4 we may collapse Q to
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standard ZFU, and micro-atoms behave exactly like macro-atoms. That fact
confirms my claim that extensional identity is not a (continuum) limit case for
indistinguishability. Any modification in Q4 demands a discrete transition (by
changing its statement) from one old version into a new one.
All those features concerning Q confirm that quasi-set theory was quite
successful as a formal translation of one of the main ideas of Heinz Post, namely,
that non-individuality of quantum particles should be assumed right at the start .
Permutations are not observable, according to the next theorem in Q. For
understanding its statement, it is important to know that [z] corresponds to
the qset of all terms which are indistinguishable from z; and z′ is a qset whose
quasi-cardinality is extensionally identical to 1 and such that z′ ⊆ [z]. Besides,
in Q there is an axiom for union which allows us to write x ∪ y for the union
between qsets x and y.
Theorem 1 Let x be a finite qset (its quasi-cardinality is a natural number)
such that x 6=E [z] and z is an m-atom such that z ∈ x. If w ≡ z and w 6∈ x,
then there exists w′ such that (x− z′) ∪ w′ ≡ x.
In order to prove this theorem, the authors in [10] consider two scenarios:
first, the case where t ∈ z′ does not belong to x; second, the case where t ∈ z′
does belong to x. Then they conclude that, for x finite, any ‘exchange’ (ob-
serve the quotation marks, which are originally used by French and Krause)
of elements z by the corresponding indistinguishable elements w results a qset
which is indistinguishable from x. The problem here, however, is the fact that
Q cannot decide if there was indeed any permutation at all. In the first scenario,
the proof seems to suggest there was no permutation. In the second one we are
induced to believe there was a permutation. But both of them produce the same
result, in the sense that in both situations we have (x− z′)∪w′ is indistinguish-
able from x. So, what is the difference between (i) a metaphysical view in which
permutations do take place but are not observable and (ii) a metaphysical view
in which permutations simply do not occur? If the Symmetrization Postulate is
not clear enough - when expressed in intuitive terms - quasi-set theory does not
improve that situation. Invariance principles in physics are always verifiable.
But that does not happen here, within Q. Since there is physical evidence of vi-
olation of SP [1] [28], quasi-set theory seems to offer an undesirable solution for
its formal statement. After all, are there degrees of indistinguishability which
could explain those slight violations of the SP? A useful analogy can be made
with the concept of force in classical mechanics. Newton’s second law refers, in
principle, to resultant forces and individual forces. But how can we make the
distinction between a resultant force and an individual one? That’s why Hertz
[14] proposed a new mechanics, in the 19th century, where the notion of force
is not among its primitive concepts [33] [36]. That happened because Hertz
understood the notion of force has a strong metaphysical commitment which is
hardly justifiable in physical terms. Since the permutation between individual
forces and resultant forces are not observable, how can we guarantee that any
inertial body is not being pushed by angels in such a way that the resultant
force from those angels is null?
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In [9] the authors show how to avoid the label-tensor-product-vector-space-
formalism of quantum field theory when dealing with indistinguishable quanta,
by using quasi-set theory. According to them, “states in this new vector space,
that we call the Q-space, refer only to occupation numbers and permutation
operators act as the identity operator on them, reflecting in the formalism the
unobservability of permutations, a goal of quasi-set theory”. Nevertheless, in
that paper (and in its preceding work in [8]) the authors ignore the fact that
indistinguishability in quantum theories may refer to much more than just the
unobservability of permutations. So, their quasi-set-theoretic approach to Fock
spaces does not necessarily take into account all quantum phenomena where
indistinguishability plays a significant role. Consequently, that fact may seri-
ously undermine any ambition for the understanding of the problem of non-
individuality in the quantum realm, as I discuss in the next Section.
4 Which-Way Information and Quasi-Sets
This section presents the first logical and philosophical difficulties of quasi-set
theory to cope with Mandel’s degrees of indistinguishability. In the next Section
I discuss this subject in a more detailed way, by suggesting there is no need to
postulate that indistinguishability entails any sort of non-individuality.
According to Mario Rabinowitz [31], “[t]he wave-particle duality is the main
point of demarcation between quantum and classical physics, and is the quintessen-
tial mystery of quantum mechanics.” Such a statement may be easily seen as
an exaggeration. After all, quantum theories in general present many unex-
pected features if we compare them to classical physics. The problem of non-
individuality itself is obviously one of them. But we could recall other aspects,
like the inherent probabilistic character of quantum phenomena, non-locality,
non-realism, interaction-free measurements, and so on. Nevertheless, there is
no doubt the wave-particle duality plays a major role on the distinction be-
tween quantum mechanics and classical mechanics. Mandel’s work (presented
above) is made within a field-theoretic framework, since he employs the annihi-
lation operator aˆ. Nevertheless, the annihilation operator is used just in order
to get interference fringes in a non-relativistic setting. So, mutatis mutandis ,
this non-relativistic quantum field theory is consistent with standard quantum
mechanics.
According to French and Krause [10], a considerable body of evidence from
quantum mechanics points to a rather peculiar perspective regarding individ-
uality: quantum particles are somehow devoid of individuality, while classical
particles are endowed with some sort of “transcendental individuality” (if we
use Post’s terminology). That philosophical view was inspired on key ideas by
Heinz Post, Erwin Schro¨dinger, Yuri Manin, and many others. And that view
has a metaphysical appeal [25]. So, quasi-set theory was introduced as a gen-
uine formal framework for dealing with this metaphysical perspective. That is
why the notion of indistinguishability ≡ was introduced in the sense of axioms
Q1-Q4 (and other axioms) of theory Q.
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Thus, let me start with equation 3. Is it possible to provide a quasi-set-
theoretic perspective for PID in equation 3? My answer is positive, if we are
looking for a plain and simple quasi-set-theoretical picture for Mandel’s equa-
tions (like equation 4). After all, in [8] and [9] the authors show how to rewrite
Fock space formalism within the non-standard counterpart of quasi-set theory.
That happens because all they wanted was to dismiss the Symmetrization Postu-
late from quantum theory formalism. On the other hand, my answer is negative
if we are looking for explanatory power in quasi-set theory, even from an onto-
logical perspective. And that was, since its birth, the main goal proposed by
Krause and collaborators: to provide explanatory power for the problem of non-
individuality in quantum theories. So, my answer is negative simply because
the problem of non-individuality seems to be related to something else besides
the Symmetrization Postulate.
According to equation 3,
PID + PD = 1,
where both terms take values in the [0, 1] real interval. So, if s1 and s2 denote
the secondary sources, we could translate this (within the language of Q) as
s1 ≡ s2 iff PID = 1, (6)
which is equivalent to say
s1 ≡ s2 iff PD = 0.
But what about all other possible real values for PID? The logical axioms
of Q are the same of classical logic. So, all we have is
¬(s1 ≡ s2) iff PID 6= 1.
In other words, all descriptive power of equation 3 is just missing in Q. If
PID = .5, then all we know from Q is that ¬(s1 ≡ s2). The same happens for all
other possible values for PID, as long PID is not 1. So, what are the proposed
quasi-set-theoretical ontological consequences for cases like PID 6= 1? How is
this related to non-individuality?
In order to avoid that inconvenience, we could recall that quasi-set theory Q
has a copy of ZFU within its universe of discourse. So, equation 3 can certainly
be expressed in Q, if we employ this ZFU counterpart of Q. Nevertheless, a
copy of ZFU within Q is just standard mathematics. So, what about the non-
standard part of Q? If quasi-set theory is supposed to provide the mathematics
of non-individuality (as stated by French and Krause in chapter 7 of their book
[10]), such a mathematical framework should take into account those degrees of
indistinguishability which naturally occur in the double-slit experiment.
Another possible strategy to deal with equation 3 in Q is by assuming
s1 ≡ s2 iff PID 6= 0.
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But once again we loose the descriptive power of equation 3.
What do I mean by “descriptive power”? Mandel’s results suggest something
like a continuum spectrum of “levels of indistinguishability”. And those levels of
indistinguishability are measurable by means of fringes visibility in the double-
slit experiment. But according to axiom Q4 there is no such a thing like “levels
of indistinguishability” in Q. That happens because two arbitrary terms x and
y are either indistinguishable (x ≡ y) or distinguishable (¬(x ≡ y)). And that
is all! Besides, extensional identity =E in Q (which is equivalent to identity
= in ZFU) is no continuous limit at all of indistinguishability ≡, as already
discussed.
Notwithstanding, for the sake of argument let me dismiss for a while the
concept of extensional identity. After all, if x and y are distinguishable (i.e.,
¬(x ≡ y)), that fact does not entail x =E x (or y =E y). In other words, even
when we are talking about distinguishable terms of Q, that does not necessarily
mean those terms are provided by some sort of identity. Therefore, in order
to accommodate Mandel’s results in Q there is no need to assume extensional
identity is supposed to be a continuum limit of indistinguishability. So, what
happens if we focus our attention on indistinguishability alone?
Since quasi-set theory allows us to define a natural extension of the concept
of function in ZFU [19] [22], what about a quasi-set-theoretic notion of fuzzy
indistinguishability? If that is possible, then there is a good chance of talking
about levels of indistinguishability, as required by Mandel’s results (which, by
the way, were extended even for light polarization [39]).
Roughly speaking, a quasi-function with domain x and codomain y is a
quasi-set f of ordered pairs 〈a, b〉 such that: (i) for all a ∈ x there is an image
b ∈ y such that 〈a, b〉 ∈ f ; and (ii) if 〈a, b〉 ∈ f , 〈a′, b′〉 ∈ f , and a ≡ a′, then
b ≡ b′. In other words, any pair of indistinguishable elements from domain x
have indistinguishable images in the codomain y.
It is worth recalling again there is a copy of ZFU in Q. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to define standard real numbers ℜ in Q, where identity = in ℜ is replaced
by extensional identity =E . More than that, standard inequality relations be-
tween real numbers like <, >, ≤, ≥, and 6= are replaced, respectively, by their
quasi-set-theoretic counterparts <E, >E , ≤E, ≥E , and 6=E . Within the ZFU-
copy of real numbers ℜ in Q, I am using the standard notation for real numbers
operations like sum (+), difference (−), and multiplication.
I hope the reader realizes I am not loosing my focus on indistinguishability,
as proposed above. I am just trying to use the ZFU counterpart of Q in order
to allow a definition of degrees of indistinguishability. But I am not trying to
get extensional identity as some sort of continuum limit of indistinguishability,
since it was already argued that such a task is not doable.
Thus, one possible quasi-set-theoretic solution for the notion of “degree of
indistinguishability” is accomplished by the following definitions.
Definition 3 〈M,d〉 is a quasi-metric space iff
QM1) M is a non-empty quasi-set.
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QM2) d :M ×M → ℜ is a quasi-function such that for each ordered pair 〈a, b〉,
there is an image d〈a, b〉 called the quasi-distance between a and b.
QM3) d〈a, b〉 ≥E 0.
QM4) d〈a, b〉 =E 0 iff a ≡ b.
QM5) d〈a, b〉 =E d〈b, a〉.
QM6) d〈a, c〉 ≤E d〈a, b〉+ d〈b, c〉
This last definition is a natural generalization of metric spaces in ZFU. If
M is a ZFU-set (i.e., Z(M)), then all occurrences of ≡ may be replaced by =E ;
and so we have a standard definition of metric space.
Now consider a special case of quasi-metric space such that the codomain of
d is the interval [0, 1] ⊂ ℜ. We can call this a differentiation quasi-metric space.
So,
Definition 4 If 〈M,d〉 is a differentiation quasi-metric space, and a ∈ M and
b ∈M , then
a ≡r b⇔ r =E 1− d〈a, b〉
A straightforward consequence of definition 4 is the theorem below:
a ≡1 b⇔ a ≡ b. (7)
That is easily proven from axiom QM4. Besides, if r 6=E 1, then
a ≡r b⇔ ¬(a ≡ b). (8)
So, thanks to this last definition, I have defined a whole class (the term
“class” here is used in a merely intuitive sense, since there are no classes in Q
and binary relations are no terms) of binary relations ≡r. In other words, the
arbitrary one-photon state given by equation 1 could be somehow ingeniously
associated to a quasi-set M of possible secondary sources such that
s1 ≡r s2 ⇔ PID =E r,
which is consistent with equations 6 and 7.
But what can the axioms of Q elucidate about ≡r when r 6=E 1? Unfortu-
nately, nothing at all. And equation 8 proves my claim. If r 6=E 1, then a ≡r b
is equivalent to ¬(a ≡ b) within the context of a differentiation quasi-metric
space. And that’s it!
From a purely syntactic point of view, the axioms of Q do not provide any
insight about ≡r when r 6=E 1. And from a philosophical perspective, the ax-
ioms of Q are supposed to deliver us an intended interpretation which associates
indistinguishability to non-individuality. Such an intended interpretation con-
cerns a metaphysical assumption about identity. If s1 is indistinguishable from
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s2 in a way such that s1 6=E s2, then s1 and s2 are both devoid of identity. But
what about the case where s1 ≡r s2 for r 6=E 1? Where is the descriptive power
of quasi-sets in order to cope with degrees of indistinguishability?
The point here is the evidence that quasi-set theory Q provides a limited
view regarding indistinguishability in the quantum realm. That happens due
to: (i) a clear separation between macro- and micro-atoms; (ii) a clear sepa-
ration between the cases where indistinguishability entails extensional identity
and those cases where that cannot happen; and (iii) the fact thatQ was partially
motivated by the Symmetrization Postulate as evidence for a lack of individual-
ity among quantum particles. And the Symmetrization Postulate is a problem
of combinatorics, while degrees of indistinguishability are expressed in the con-
tinuum of real numbers between 0 and 1. Such a limited vision seems to work
just fine when we want to accommodate quantum statistics and quantum states
of atoms (like Helium), since such phenomena may be reduced to purely corpus-
cular approaches (at least within the non-relativistic description of elementary
particles). Nevertheless, indistinguishability in quantum theories may refer to
quantum trajectories as well (i.e., field sources). And quantum trajectories are
remarkably different from classical trajectories, due to restrictions imposed by
the uncertainty principle. More than that, quantum trajectories behave quite
differently from quantum particles as well, at least in an experimental setup like
a double-slit apparatus: at first sight it makes no sense at all to talk about gases
of trajectories and it makes no sense to talk about trajectories permutations. In
the particular case of the double-slit experiment we can find a striking example
to illustrate the wave/particle duality in quantum mechanics. And that duality
is not anticipated within Q axioms.
So, all of this leads us to a fundamental question: how is particle indistin-
guishability related to path indistinguishability in the double-slit experiment?
After all, those paths in the double-slit experiment are simply field sources. How
those degrees of indistinguishability between field sources are related to the in-
distinguishability between a single photon and a single photon in the double-slit
experiment? A full account for this problem demands at least a field-theoretic
approach for quantum phenomena, in order to establish relationships between
photons and their sources, and photons and their detection. Nevertheless, it still
remains the problem of determining what precisely is the meaning of a degree of
indistinguishability, besides some number in the unit interval which is coincident
with degree of coherence. A proposal for dealing with this problem is presented
in the next Section. Final criticisms about quasi-sets are also provided.
5 Discussion
Quasi-set theory is a genuine logical approach to cope with collections of objects
where a standard notion of identity seems to be irrelevant, like what it seems
to happen in quantum mechanics and non-relativistic quantum field theory.
Besides, quasi-set theory allows us a better understanding about the epistemo-
logical character of standard identity in ZFU [22]. Nevertheless, the domain
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of explanatory power of quasi-set theory in the quantum realm seems to be
limited to those quantum phenomena which are reducible to a purely corpus-
cular approach. Mandel’s results concerning degrees of indistinguishability are
physically measurable by means of fringes visibility in the double-slit experi-
ment. And such degrees of indistinguishability cannot be understood within
quasi-set theory from any relevant standpoint, whether in a mathematical or
in a philosophical discussion about individuality. Quasi-sets introduce a weaker
equivalence relation ≡ called indistinguishability. If x ≡ y but x 6=E y, then
it makes sense to say x and y are somehow devoid of identity. But what it
means to say that two given trajectories in the double-slit experiment are indis-
tinguishable with a degree r ∈ [0, 1]? Is it sound to talk about some notion of
indexed identity?
It may seem to be the case that those degrees of indistinguishability sug-
gested by Mandel are a straight consequence of an allegedly lack of individuality
of a single photon (if we assume a current metaphysical assumption inspired on
Post, Schro¨dinger, Manin, French, Krause, and others). But how precisely would
that happen? Well, a natural interpretation of Mandel’s results is that fringe
visibility V and which-way information PID in the double-slit experiment are
complementary quantities due to the wave/particle duality of light. That inter-
pretation is consistent with the Uncertainty Principle proposed in [6]. There is
a variety of quantitative statements of the so-called wave-particle duality rela-
tions (WPDRs). For a list of references on this see [6]. And in that same paper
the authors show that WPDRs are equivalent to a modern formulation of the
Uncertainty Principle. That means the apparent lack of individuality of a single
photon cannot be properly modeled in mathematical terms without considering
such intrinsic relations between particle and wave. The uncertainty principle
proposed in [6] can be seen as a generalization of Mandel’s work. The authors’
strategy in [6] is to think of waveparticle duality in terms of guessing games, and
anyones ability to win such games is quantified by entropic quantities. Specif-
ically, an observer is asked to guess one of two complementary observables,
namely, (i) which path the photon took in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer or
(ii) which phase was applied inside the interferometer. The which-path (corpus-
cular aspect) and which-phase (wave aspect) observables are complementary.
The Uncertainty Principle gives a fundamental restriction about which states
the observer is unable to guess about both observables. That means the allegedly
lack of individuality of a single photon is not enough for understanding Mandel’s
results, since there is a complementary principle between path indistinguishabil-
ity and wave phase information. More than that, indistinguishability relations
do not apply solely to quantum particles, but to photons sources (trajectories)
as well.
Besides, other physical phenomena seem to be unreachable from a quasi-set-
theoretic perspective, like those evidences of slight violation of the Symmetriza-
tion Postulate, as discussed above. In quantum field theory formalism, e.g.,
there are exotic symmetries which may be understood as a smooth interpola-
tion between symmetric and antisymmetric states [29]. If we adopt the common
philosophical vision that indistinguishability is directly related to permutability
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[37], how can quasi-set theory deal with such interpolations and still provide
a philosophical account for non-individuality? Are there measurable degrees
of transition between symmetric and antisymmetric states? All those issues
seem to point to a mathematics of the continuum rather than a discrete one.
Arguably, quasi-set theory fails as providing philosophical grounds for the con-
cept of non-individuality in quantum mechanics because there are no degrees of
indistinguishability in Q. And such degrees of indistinguishability seem to be
related to interactions among quantum objects, as described by quantum (non-
relativistic) field theories. That means such degrees of indistinguishability may
have a great deal of impact on other physical phenomena besides interferometry,
as suggested in [28].
Another problem refers to the classical limit of quantum theories. A quite
disturbing fact about the Symmetrization Postulate (stated in quantum me-
chanics and non-relativistic quantum field theories) is that it survives the clas-
sical limit [7]. Nevertheless, the (allegedly equivalent) Symmetrization Postulate
stated in Q is a theorem (in that formal theory) only for the case of indistin-
guishable micro-atoms (if we are talking about two or more objects). Hence, if
micro-atoms of Q are supposed to describe quantum objects, what do macro-
atoms correspond to? Macro-atoms in Q are supposed to be individuals, while
micro-atoms are not. So, Q seems to be a very limited choice for understand-
ing the classical limit of quantum theories. Actually, according to Dieks and
Lubberdink [7] it is quite possible that most discussions regarding the status
of indistinguishable quantum particles are simply misguided. And that would
happen because the Symmetrization Postulate refers to indices which do not
correspond to any notion of particle at all.
So, what would be a way to cope with path indistinguishability (due to an
apparent lack of individuality of photons) in the double-slit experiment and its
relationship to coherence? If there is any answer to that problem, the same
solution is supposed to cope with possible violations of the Symmetrization
Postulate, and the classical limit of quantum mechanics.
As remarked before, the Symmetrization Postulate is simply some sort of
vague intuition about indistinguishability which is hardly well definable (in the
sense of providing some intuition about it) by means of a formal framework.
Even in the case of quantum statistics, Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac work
fine only for ideal gases where interactions are not taken into account. And the
Symmetrization Postulate is a mathematical statement within discrete math-
ematics. Nevertheless, Mandel’s degrees of indistinguishability and related re-
sults concerning a new Uncertainty Principle [6] tell us that we should think by
means of a mathematics of the continuum (not a discrete one). So, one possible
way to deal with all those problems is by considering the possibility there is
nothing wrong with identity. Maybe the issue is not identity, but logic.
Within intuitionistic logic, for example, the double negation of a formula F
does not necessarily entail F . Smooth infinitesimal analysis [3], e.g., allows us
to talk about multiple indistinguishable terms without ever considering either
permutations or properties. In other words, there is no need for any fundamental
axiom about the unobservability of permutations. And there is no need for
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considering Leibnizs Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. That means
we can precisely describe indistinguishable terms - which are not necessarily
identical - and still avoid symmetrization as a postulate. That happens because
“¬(x 6= y) ⇒ x = y” is not a theorem in smooth infinitesimal analysis, since
this well-known framework for differential and integral calculus is based on a
intuitionistic framework with (intuitionistic) identity. Permutations can still be
clearly defined, since this framework does not necessarily abandon identity. But
permutations can be eventually indistinguishable in the sense that intuitionistic
logic does not allow us to decide if certain collections x and y are either identical
or different. In that case, x and y are indistinguishable.
Motivated by the Kochen-Specker Theorem, Isham and Butterfield [16] pro-
vided a realistic interpretation for quantum mechanics based on intuitionistic
logic. Their space of multiple semantic values is defined by a Heyting Alge-
bra. Formulas from quantum mechanics are associated to such semantic values,
which define a specific bounded lattice. Since every totally ordered set is a
lattice, it is possible (at least in principle) to find out that Mandel’s degrees
of indistinguishability are simply semantic values expressed by elements from
the real interval [0, 1], which is a particular case of a Heyting Algebra if [0, 1] is
endowed with the usual ≤ relation. Thus, we do not need to consider quantum
particles as non-individuals in any strong philosophical sense. An analogous
situation happens with quantum trajectories in an experimental setup like the
double-slit experiment. If x and y denote paths in a Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer, then the formula x = y can be associated to a semantic value r in a
Heyting Algebra, if we admit the logic which is lurking in the quantum realm
is an intuitionistic one. Eventually, r can be a real number in the unit [0, 1]
interval.
So, indistinguishability may not be any issue regarding identity. Indistin-
guishability may be a problem about decidability within a logical framework
which is simply not classical. But that is a possibility that demands further
investigation.
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